Fr Peter-Hans Kolvenbach once made the daring statement, ‘Probably, Ignatius was the first person in the history of Christian spirituality to perceive the Trinity as God at work – as the God who continues to work, always filling up the universe and actively awakening the divine life in all things for the salvation of humanity.’1 In Fr Kolvenbach’s view, if there is something distinctive about St Ignatius Loyola’s vision of the Trinity, it lies in his insistence on the activity of the triune God in the whole of creation and especially in our history. Fr Kolvenbach draws a comparison between ‘the trinitarian devotion characteristic of the monastic tradition,’ which he describes as ‘a repose in abandonment to the mystery of the contemplation of glory’ and Ignatius’s trinitarian spirituality, which entails as well ‘a contemplation of all created things, starting in their Creator who is the Trinity.’2 The source and origin of this distinctive trinitarian devotion, says Fr Kolvenbach, is Ignatius’s experience of Christ, who from the beginning is for him ‘one of the Trinity,’ who always ‘comes as God,’ and who is called ‘Christ our Lord,’ ‘the Christ,’ ‘the Lord,’ ‘the Eternal Word,’ much more often than he is known simply as ‘Jesus.’3

This is a helpful entrée into the topic on which I have been asked to speak: the respective trinitarian visions of St Ignatius Loyola and Bernard Lonergan. For the activity of the triune God, at least in our history if not in the rest of creation, is a function of what have come to be known as the divine missions, visible and invisible, of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the trinitarian vision of Bernard Lonergan contains resources for developing an extraordinarily rich theology of the divine missions.

In the present paper I will first present my interpretation of, and development on, at least one aspect of Lonergan’s theology of the divine missions. I will then appeal to an analogy that I find hidden in the text of the Spiritual Exercises that supports this theol-

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1 ROBERT M. DORAN S.J., Emmett Doerr Chair in Systematic Theology at Marquette University, Milwaukee.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. 24.
ogy of the missions, an analogy that might be used for approaching the trinitarian processions by appealing to the divine missions. Finally, relying again on Fr Kolvenbach, I will call attention to a difference between the trinitarian vision of Ignatius and that of Lonergan: a difference that is not doctrinal, and certainly not a matter of dialectical contradiction, but a function of the respective times, ages, centuries, and situations in which the two trinitarian visions emerged, and of the questions that were raised in the world and in the church under those different conditions. I hope I may be so bold as to suggest that the difference manifests a genetic development on Lonergan’s part.

1. An Interpretation of and Development upon Lonergan’s Understanding of the Trinitarian Missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit

The most complete presentation of Lonergan’s understanding of the divine missions is found in the sixth chapter of his *De Deo trino: Pars systematica*, which is now available with English translation in the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, under the title *The Triune God: Systematics.*

The theology of the divine missions presented there develops the central thesis of question 43 in the first part of Thomas Aquinas’s *Summa theologiae*. That thesis maintains that the divine missions are the divine processions joined to created external terms. Thus, while Fr Kolvenbach may well be correct that Ignatius was the first in the history of Christian spirituality to insist on the Trinity as God at work in creation and history, there is a systematic-theological hypothesis in the *Summa* that certainly substantiates and supports that Ignatian spiritual posture: the missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit are the processions immanent in the triune God joined to created external terms, where the terms are required conditions for the truth of the propositions which affirm that the Son and the Holy Spirit are sent into the world. It is from this affirmation, I believe, that we may understand and develop Karl Rahner’s *Grundaxiom* that the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity, and vice versa, without incurring the misinterpretations to which Rahner’s own thoroughly sound doctrinal intentions have been at times subjected.

The richness and novelty of Lonergan’s appropriation of Thomas’s hypothesis are found, first, in his methodological treatment of the intricacies of contingent predication about God, and, second, in the brilliant hypotheses that he presents regarding the cre-
ated external terms that are the consequent condition of the truth of the proposition that the missions are the processions joined to created external terms. I need not go into Lonergan’s methodological doctrine regarding contingent predication. For one thing, I do not have the time. For another, you would all fall asleep. But I must emphasize his original position on the created terms that are consequent conditions of the truth of the judgment that the missions are the processions.

In the case of the mission of the Son, that created term is for Lonergan what Aquinas in one late work called the secondary act of existence accruing to the assumed human nature of the incarnate Word. I say ‘for Lonergan’ because Aquinas did not use the expression ‘esse secundarium’ when speaking of the created term that makes the procession of the Word also a mission. It seems highly probable that Aquinas’s use of the term ‘esse secundarium’ occurred after he wrote the first part of the *Summa theologiae* in which the theology of the divine missions is presented.

In the case of the mission of the Holy Spirit, the created term is what since the theology of the Middle Ages has been known as sanctifying grace. Here Aquinas and Lonergan use the same expression.

But Lonergan adds quite original further hypotheses regarding each of these terms, and in each case we find a further confirmation, from a systematic-theological point of view, of the Ignatian insistence highlighted by Fr Kolvenbach regarding the Trinity at work in history.

For Lonergan proposes that the secondary act of existence of the Incarnation may be understood as a created participation in, and imitation and communication of, divine paternity, that is, of the Father; that sanctifying grace may be understood as a created participation in, and imitation and communication of, divine active spiration, that is, of the Father and the Son as together they breathe the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity that proceeds from sanctifying grace may be understood as a created participation in, and imitation and communication of, divine passive spiration, that is, of the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory may be understood as a created participation in, and imitation and communication of, divine filiation, of the Son as he leads the children of God perfectly home to the Father.

This so-called ‘four-point hypothesis’ is, in my humble view, one of the most profound expressions of trinitarian theology in the history of Christian thought. It almost, in Lonergan’s words written in another (though not foreign) context, brings God too close to us. Let me expand on this.

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6 ‘...the supernatural solution not only meets a human need but also goes beyond it to transform it into the point of insertion into human life of truths beyond human comprehension, of values beyond human estimation, of an alliance and a love that, so to speak, brings God too close to man.’ BERNARD LONERGAN, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, vol. 3 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) 747.
The secondary act of existence is the is that is affirmed in the proposition, ‘The eternal Word of God is this human being Jesus of Nazareth.’ The proposition not only reflects, but also gives a new emphasis to, the aspect of Jesus’ identity that Ignatius insisted be to the fore, namely, that he is ‘one of the Trinity.’ In Lonergan’s development of Aquinas’s late suggestion regarding the secondary act of existence, this created is – the eternal Word of God is this human being Jesus of Nazareth – is a created participation in, and imitation and communication of, the divine relation of paternity, that is, of the Father. One can hardly go further than this in reflecting the Ignatian emphasis on the activity of the trinitarian God in creation and history. But why does Lonergan make this point? What does this hypothesis mean?

Perhaps the hypothesis is rooted in the fact that, while the eternal Word immanent to the triune God does not speak but rather is spoken, or in Thomas’s words that its notional act, its distinguishing characteristic, is not dicere but dici, still the Word that is incarnate through this created is not only speaks but also, as the fourth gospel makes abundantly clear, speaks only what he hears from the Father. And that eternal Word become flesh through the created is of the assumed humanity leads us all back to the eternal Father, through hope in this life, and through beatific knowing and loving in the life to come. This knowing and loving are conditioned by the created elevation of human intelligence and love traditionally known as the light of glory, an elevation created precisely so that the triune divine nature itself may insinuate itself into our created intelligence and love as the immediate object of our knowing and loving. The heights of mystical experience in this life are a foretaste of this elevation and beatific knowing and loving, which occur in their fullness only in the new creation that is eternal life.

But perhaps the closest Ignatian parallel in Lonergan’s trinitarian vision can be identified if we consider what Lonergan does with the relations of sanctifying grace and charity as these provide an analogy in the order of grace for understanding the immanent trinitarian relations of active and passive spiration, that is, of the Father and the Son eternally breathing the Holy Spirit and of the Holy Spirit eternally proceeding from this active breathing.7

2. An Ignatian Analogy for the Divine Processions

The Ignatian parallel to which I am referring is found in the first point in the ‘Contemplation for Obtaining Love’ in the Spiritual Exercises:

The first point is to call to mind the benefits received, of my creation, redemption, and particular gifts, dwelling with great affection on how much God our Lord has done for me, and how much He has given me of that which He has; and consequently, how much He desires to give me Himself in so far as He can according to his Divine ordinance; and then

7 There are indications of a development along these lines as early as 1935. See BERNARD LONERGAN, ‘Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis,’ Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 9:2 (1991) 159.
to reflect in myself what I, on my side, with great reason and justice, ought to offer and give to His Divine Majesty, that is to say, all things that are mine, and myself with them, saying as one who makes an offering, with great affection: ‘Take, O Lord, and receive all my liberty, my memory, my understanding, and all my will, whatever I have and possess. Thou hast given all these things to me; to Thee, O Lord, I restore them: all are Thine; dispose of them all according to Thy will. Give me Thy love and Thy grace, for this is enough for me.’

In *Missions and Processions*, I argue that there is an analogy hidden here for understanding the immanent divine processions.

The analogy starts with the reception of God’s love, recollected in memory, from which, when this is grasped as evidence, there proceeds a set of judgments of value; from these two together (the gift and the word) there flows the charity that is the love of God in return. The recollection in memory of the divine favor is an analogue for the divine Father, the set of judgments of value that proceeds from this *memoria* is an analogue for the divine Son, and the charity that is the love of God in return is an analogue for the proceeding Love that is the Holy Spirit. Created grace thus has a Trinitarian form ... [Ignatius’s] contemplation contains the basic structure that I am suggesting: memory recollecting and making thematic the gift that one has received, the judgment of value that this is indeed very good, and the awakening of love for the One who has first loved us. Memory and judgment of value together are a created share in active spiration, and the awakening of love in return is a created participation in passive spiration.  

Thus, the memory and judgment of value to which Ignatius is appealing, when taken together, may function as an analogy for the togetherness of Father and Son in active spiration, while the awakening of love in return is an analogy for the passive spiration that is the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son, or, if you wish, from the Father through the Son.

I am not claiming, of course, that Ignatius consciously and knowingly grasped the possible speculative-theological significance of the analogy that I find hidden in his words. I am sure that he did not! Nor was that his concern. But I find it quite significant that the dynamic flow of conscious events reflected in the first point of his ‘Contemplation’ has the identically same structure as is found in the principal analogies for understanding divine procession that had been presented earlier in the history of Western Catholic theology, namely, the analogies of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. The structure is that of a dynamic unfolding from an origin or principle, through a word, and to a culmination in love.

In fact, the only real difference in the principal analogies that have, for better or for worse, been grouped under the category of ‘psychological analogy’ has to do with the identity of the first step, that is, of what qualifies as principle or origin. For Augustine it is *memoria*, memory, and for Aquinas it is *intelligere*, the act of understanding.

Now, as regards the expression of the psychological analogy, only one significant development on Aquinas has been offered since the *Summa*, and interestingly enough...

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* DORAN, *Missions and Processions* 81-82.
for our present purposes it is the development proposed by the later Lonergan. In his classic earlier presentation of a systematic-theological treatise on the Trinity, Lonergan follows Aquinas in speaking of the triad intelligere – verbum – amor, understanding – word – love, while providing a more detailed psychological analysis than can be found in Aquinas of the conscious processions of word from understanding and of love from both understanding and word. But in his later analogy Lonergan comes close to the analogy that I am finding hidden in Ignatius’s first point in the ‘Contemplation.’ Let me quote:

The psychological analogy ... has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.

Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named ho Theos, who is identified with agápē (1 John 4.8, 16). Such love expresses itself in its Word, its Logos, its verbum spirans amorem, which is a judgment of value. The judgment of value is sincere, and so it grounds the Proceeding Love that is identified with the Holy Spirit.

There are, then, two processions that may be conceived in God; they are not unconscious processes but intellectually, rationally, morally conscious, as are judgments of value based on the evidence perceived by a lover, and the acts of loving grounded on judgments of value. The two processions ground four real relations of which three are really distinct from one another; and these three are not just relations as relations, and so modes of being, but also subsistent, and so not just paternity and filiation [and passive spiration] but also Father and Son [and Holy Spirit]. Finally, Father and Son and Spirit are eternal; their consciousness is not in time but timeless; their subjectivity is not becoming but ever itself; and each in his own distinct manner is subject of the infinite act that God is, the Father as originating love, the Son as judgment of value expressing that love, and the Spirit as originated loving.⁹

Where this later expression of the psychological analogy differs from what I am calling the hidden analogy in Ignatius’s first point in the ‘Contemplation’ is, again, with respect to the identity of the origin or principle. In Ignatius, that origin or principle is close to Augustine’s memoria – ‘call to mind the benefits received’ – whereas in Lonergan’s later analogy it is found in what he calls ‘the dynamic state of being in love.’ And yet really the starting points are not all that different once we realize that the reason we are in the dynamic state of being in love is precisely because we have first been on the receiving end of God’s love and are enabled in grace to love by participating in God’s own love. Ignatius’s ‘call to mind’ is little more than the recollection of how deeply we have been loved. ‘In this is love, not that we loved God but that he loved us and sent his Son to be the atoning sacrifice for our sins’ (1 John 4.10). That memoria aspect present in Ignatius’s ‘Contemplation’ is brought to the fore in the analogy that I have suggested in Missions and Processions. That analogy is expressed in compact form in thesis 6 in that book:

The trinitarian structure of created grace provides a psychological analogy for understanding Trinitarian life, an analogy whose structure is isomorphic with the analogies suggested by Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan. Thus there is established an analogy for understanding Trinitarian processions that obtains in the supernatural order itself. This analogy joins Augustine in positing memoria as the first step, where memoria is the retrospective appropriation of the condition in which one finds oneself gifted by unconditional love. Memoria and the judgment of value (faith) that follows from it as verbum spirans amorem participate in active spiration. The charity that flows from them participates in passive spiration. The memoria in this analogy is represented in Ignatius’s ‘call to mind.’ The judgment of value in this analogy is represented in Ignatius’s ‘to reflect in myself what I, on my side, with great reason and justice, ought to offer and give,’ and the charity in this analogy is represented in ‘Take and receive.’ There really is a hidden analogy in the spiritual interiority represented in the first point in Ignatius’s ‘Contemplation.’

3. A Genetic Development

I said at the beginning that my third section would ‘call attention to a difference between the trinitarian visions of Ignatius and Lonergan: a difference that is not doctrinal, and certainly not a matter of dialectical contradiction, but a function of the respective times, ages, centuries, and situations in which the two trinitarian visions emerged.’ I indicated that I believe the difference manifests a genetic development on Lonergan’s and/or my part, and while that is not the central point I wish to communicate, I will for the sake of conversation indicate why I believe it is, drawing if I may on texts from the Second Vatican Council and Pope St John Paul II.

The difference can best be accessed quickly if we focus on the word in parentheses in the thesis just quoted, ‘faith.’ That word is used there in apposition with the judgment of value that follows from calling to mind the benefits received from divine goodness and love. The faith expressed in that judgment of value breathes the charity expressed in Ignatius’s ‘Take and receive,’ and so is identified in my exposition with Aquinas’s and Lonergan’s verbum spirans amorem, ‘word breathing love.’

The faith that I am referring to here is the faith that Lonergan in Method in Theology explicitly distinguishes from beliefs, the faith that he defines as ‘the knowledge born of religious love.’ It is not, of course, in conflict with the beliefs identified with explicit Christian commitment, but it is not the same thing. It is rather what Pascal spoke of when, in Lonergan’s words, ‘he remarked that the heart has reasons which reason does not know.’ There is, says Lonergan, ‘besides the factual knowledge reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying, ... another kind of knowledge reached through

10 DORAN, Missions and Processions 33-34.
the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a person in love,’ and ‘[f]aith ... is such further knowledge when the love is God’s love flooding our hearts.’

Lonergan is clear in his insistence that such knowledge born of love is not limited to Christians, since the love of God from which such knowledge is born is not given only to Christians. Thus one merit, he says, of the distinction that he has drawn between faith and explicit Christian beliefs is that thereby ‘the ancient problem of the salvation of non-Christians is greatly reduced.’ In fact, says Lonergan, his distinction is little more than a transposition into interiority terms of a traditional distinction between ‘the light of faith’ (lumen fidei), now identified with ‘faith’ and the ‘faith’ that now is identified with religious beliefs. However that may be – and it does make sense – the point is not lost. The word that proceeds from the gift of God’s love is a judgment of value that breathes the charity that is inseparable from the sanctifying grace required for salvation, and those gifts are offered to all.

At the same time, if the triad of memoria – faith – charity is taken as an analogy in the order of grace to help us understand the divine processions immanent to the life of God, then the faith born of religious love remembered or called to mind, the faith that is the word that itself breathes charity, is also not only an analogue for, but also a graced participation in, and imitation and communication of, the divine Word, now given in a manner that is hidden, anonymous, and invisible. It must be said, then, that there a mission of the Word independent of, but not unrelated to, the palpable, incarnate, visible mission in Jesus of Nazareth. And that invisible mission of the Word is just as much connected with an invisible mission of the Holy Spirit as the incarnate mission of the Word in Jesus is connected with the palpable mission of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. The moves that Lonergan has made and that I have attempted to develop and clarify are the grounds of a Trinitarian theology of the religions of the world, however cautious one must be in affirming the possibility of such a theology.

The real forerunner here, at least in the community inspired by Lonergan’s work, is of course, the great Frederick Crowe, who delivered on the evening of the day on which Lonergan died, November 26, 1984, the groundbreaking lecture ‘Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions.’ I have maintained in recent years that Crowe’s lecture did not call sufficient attention to the invisible mission of the Word, but I am sure that Crowe, great Trinitarian theologian that he was, would not have objected to that criticism. There is never a mission of the Holy Spirit without a mission of the Word, just as in the immanent Trinity there cannot be a procession of the Holy Spirit without a procession of the Word or a procession of the Word without a procession of the Holy Spirit. So if there is a mission of the Holy Spirit prior to and/or independent of Pentecost, there must also be a mission of the Word prior to and/or independent of the incarnation of the Word in Jesus of Nazareth.

This latter set of affirmations is, I believe, beyond the explicit horizon available to Ignatius in his lifetime. Nonetheless, it does not render Jesus what Fr Kolvenbach in-

\[\text{\textsuperscript{12}}\text{Ibid. 112. For an extremely rich description of what such knowledge ‘knows,’ see ibid. 112-14.}\]
sists Ignatius would never allow: ‘one voice among the many voices of spiritual teachers, of the wise, and of prophets.’ In this Trinitarian vision, the Eternal Word of God who is this human being Jesus of Nazareth remains, in Fr Kolvenbach’s words, ‘the voice, the light, the truth, because Jesus has the status that none of the others have, One of the Trinity.’ Ignatius’s Christology was, again in Fr Kolvenbach’s words, ‘a Christology of the visible,’ to which ‘belongs also the body of Christ which is the Church.’ In the development that Lonergan made possible, that Crowe promoted in his notion of a ‘prior mission of the Holy Spirit,’ and that I want to round off in a theology of prior invisible missions of both the Son and the Holy Spirit, there is present at least the seed of a Christology also of the invisible, which in fact also corresponds to Vatican II’s insistence on the distinction that must be drawn between the kingdom of God that Jesus preached and the church that he founded.

Mention of Vatican II brings us to the turning point in this entire discussion. The church that for Ignatius rightly always belongs to the Christology of the visible has itself acknowledged that, in the words of ‘Gaudium et Spes,’ while it is Christ who ‘fully discloses humankind to itself and unfolds its noble calling by revealing the mystery of the Father and the Father’s love,’ the same Son of God by his incarnation ‘united himself in some sense with every human being’ (§ 22). And so the Council admits that it is not only Christians who receive ‘the first fruits of the Spirit’ (Romans 8.23), which enable them to fulfill the law of love. Rather, ‘This applies not only to Christians but to all people of good will in whose hearts grace is secretly at work. Since Christ died for everyone, and since the ultimate calling of each of us comes from God and is therefore a universal one, we are obliged to hold that the Holy Spirit offers everyone the possibility of sharing in this paschal mystery in a manner known to God’ (§ 22).

Of the several passages from the Council documents where something along these lines is said I have chosen this passage from ‘Gaudium et Spes’ because it is the passage that Pope St John Paul II explicitly refers to in ‘Redemptor hominis’ when he says that the council’s affirmation ‘applies to everyone, since everyone is included in the mystery of Redemption, and by the grace of this mystery Christ has joined himself with everyone for all time ... Every individual, from his or her very conception, participates in this mystery ... Everyone without exception was redeemed by Christ, since Christ is somehow joined to everyone, with no exception, even though the person may not be conscious of it’ (§ 14).

But these statements of the Second Vatican Council and of Pope St John Paul II are statements of doctrines. They are not, at least yet, statements of dogma, and they may never be, but because they are statements of a council and of a pope, they are more than the theological doctrines of a particular theologian, however erudite and wise he or she may be. They already have the status of church doctrines. But they also leave open the
question for systematic theology, as contrasted with doctrinal theology: how can this be? how is it to be understood and explained?

It is, I would maintain, the particular virtue of the methodological breakthroughs that Lonergan made in the move from a second stage of meaning governed by theory under the rule of logic to a third stage grounded in the appropriation of human and religious, natural and supernatural, interiority that the systematic question can be answered. A fuller answer than I am able to give to the question in the present paper, limited as it is by the number of words that I was allowed to write, would contain a much more robust theology of actual grace than is customary in most systematic treatments of the doctrine of grace.

But the point that I really want to make in conclusion is that, while the developments that Lonergan’s cognitional theory and method make possible may be beyond the explicit horizon that Ignatius was able to entertain, nonetheless it may be affirmed that the developments that made those moves possible are at least remotely available in the appropriations of interiority that Ignatius himself brilliantly enabled people to make and in the at least implicit robust theology of actual grace that the Spiritual Exercises contain, embody, and promote in the church. And that is why I would want to acknowledge that, while Ignatius’s explicit horizon is not ready to make the affirmations that Lonergan allows us to make, the relationship between Ignatius’s horizon and Lonergan’s is not dialectical in the unique sense of contradiction that is contained in Lonergan’s notion of dialectic in Method in Theology, but genetic. Lonergan writes of genetically related horizons, ‘they are related as successive stages in some process of development. Each later stage presupposes earlier stages, partly to include them and partly to transform them. Precisely because the stages are earlier and later, no two are simultaneous. They are parts, not of a single communal world, but of a single biography or of a single history.’ If I may use language associated with Lonergan’s notion of emergent probability, Ignatius’s horizon fulfills a set of conditions that had to be fulfilled before the more inclusive horizon opened by Lonergan’s developments could be achieved. Lonergan may never have reached that horizon had it not been for Ignatius.

16 LONERGAN, Method in Theology 222.